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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee / Respondent, 
vs. 
TINA HARDING, 
Appellant / Petitioner, 
Case No. 20100291-SC 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the majority of the panel of the Utah court of appeals erred in its analysis 
and/or application of the Fourth Amendment standards governing the apparent authority 
of a person to consent to the search of another person's property? On certiorari, this 
Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to 
the appeals court. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. Furthermore, the 
standard of review for search and seizure cases is the same non-deferential, correctness 
standard. Id. at Tf 15. 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of Petitioner's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Tina Harding appeals from affirmation of her conviction by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. She entered conditional pleas to possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony in Fourth District Court. 
B. Trial Court and Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition 
Tina Harding was charged by criminal information filed on March 3, 2008 in 
Fourth District Court with: Count 1 - possession or use of a controlled substance in a 
drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
503(2)(b); Count 3 - giving false personal information to a peace officer, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-507(2); and Count 4 -
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (R. 02-01). At the preliminary hearing held on 
March 19, 2008, the Court found probable cause and the charges were bound over for 
trial (R. 24-22). 
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Harding filed a motion to suppress on April 25, 2008 alleging that while the traffic 
stop was legitimate, the search exceeded the scope of the detention and was in violation 
of Harding's right to privacy in her personal belongings (R. 45-33). At the request of the 
Court, the parties submitted briefs on the suppression issue in relation to State v Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) (R. 113: 3-4). Argument on the motion was heard 
on June 4, 2008 and the trial court took the matter under advisement (R. 114). 
On June 12, 2008, the trial court denied Harding's motion to suppress (R. 77-68). 
The court ruled that the stop had de-escalated to a consensual encounter and therefore, 
the search of the vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention (R. 74-71). The court 
also ruled that Harding's expectation of privacy became irrelevant because the search of 
the bags was legal (R. 71). The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the 
officer to conclude that the bags were part of the consent given and that the search was 
lawful (R. 70). 
On June 25, 2008, Harding entered conditional pleas ol guilt guilty to Count 1 -
illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and Count 2 -
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony (R. 84-81, 
98-96). 
On August 6, 2008, Harding was given suspended sentences of one to fifteen years 
in prison for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and up to five years in 
prison for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, ordered to spend 166 
days in the Utah County Jail with credit granted for time served, placed on probation for 
36 months, and ordered to pay $15000 fine suspended to $1|60, plus interest (R. 103-93). 
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On August 29, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth District Court 
(R. 106). 
On January 22, 2010, a majority of the court of appeals panel affirmed Harding's 
convictions, concluding that it was reasonable for police to believe that the driver, a third 
party, had authority to consent to the search of Harding's bags. State v. Harding, 2010 
UT App 8, \ 19, 223 P.3d 1148. Judge Thome wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at ffif 22-
29. The State filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the court of appeals on 
February 8, 2010. 
This Court subsequently granted Harding's petition for writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On February 22, 2008 at approximately 9:30 p.m. Officer Jeffery Westerman 
initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle (1997 Chevrolet SUV Blazer) for an inoperable plate 
lamp at 100 North 500 West in Provo (Pv. 112: 4). 
2. Westerman was told by the driver, Kimberly Stacy, that her license was suspended 
(R. 112: 5). He ran a routine check and discovered that her driver's license had been 
denied (R. 112:5). 
3. Westerman requested the names and dates of birth or identification from the other 
three passengers in order to ascertain whether there was a licensed driver among them 
who could drive the vehicle from the scene (R. 112: 5). Tina Harding was the backseat 
passenger on the driver's side. 
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4. None of the passengers had a valid driver's license anjl Harding initially gave her 
name as Ruth Rascom (R. 112:6, 7). Her true identity was subsequently obtained during 
the stop (R. 112:6). 
5. Westerman testified that he did not observe any signs of impairment on the driver 
or the passengers (R. 112: 13). 
6. Westerman had the driver exit the vehicle, issued her a citation for the plate lamp 
and for the denied driver's license, and instructed her on hoW to fix her driver's license 
(R. 112: 7). He also told the driver that she was free to leave) (R. 112: 14). At this time 
the passengers were still in the vehicle (R. 112: 14, 15). 
7. The driver subsequently "came back" with another comment or question. 
Westerman asked if he could look in the vehicle, and she consented (R. 112: 7-8, 14). 
Westerman had already called for backup because of the "nervousness of the 
passengers," and Officer Lasenby arrived to assist (R. 112: ^5). 
8. Westerman then asked the passengers to "step out of the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). He 
testified the passengers were free to leave. However, his statement to them was that "if 
they wanted to wait with that other officer, while [he] took a| look in the vehicle" (R. 112: 
15). His arrest report read that he asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and "began the 
consent search of the vehicle. Officer Lazenby was watching the passengers and the 
driver of the vehicle" (R. 43). 
9. Westerman searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle (R. 112: 8). 
Directly behind the area where Harding was seated was a small space for storage where 
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two bags were located (R. 112: 8, 16). Westerman did not ask whom the bags belonged 
to before he searched them (R. 112: 16). 
10. The bags contained items specific to Harding, including mail, photos on a digital 
camera that corresponded to photos from her phone, a pink brazier, along with a black air 
soft gun, a torch and torch tips, plastic baggies of assorted sizes, butane fuel, digital 
scales which field tested positive for methamphetamine, a glass pipe with burnt 
marijuana residue, and a spoon with methamphetamine residue (R. 112: 9-10). In 
addition, methamphetamine was found in three plastic baggies, along with lithium, 
clindomycin and generic xanex pills (R. 112: 10-11). 
11. Harding was subsequently searched. A "bio sheet" was found on her person along 
with a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade (R. 112: 11). She was arrested and given 
her Miranda warnings (R. 112: 18-19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court and majority of the court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
driver had apparent authority to consent to the search of Harding's property. Under these 
facts, it was not reasonable for Officer Westerman to execute a warrantless search of 
those bags, based solely on the driver's consent. At best, Officer Westerman was 
presented with a situation where ownership and control of the bags was ambiguous. The 
Fourth Amendment and Utah law require that he make further inquiry before proceeding 
with a warrantless search of the property. Accordingly, Harding requests that this Court 
reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the denial of her motion to suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE DRIVER HAD APPARENT AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO THE 
SEARCH OF HARDING'S PROPERTY 
Harding asserts that the evidence obtained from her property within the vehicle 
must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because even if the driver's consent to 
search the vehicle was valid, the driver's authority to consent did not extend to a search 
of Harding's property in the car.1 
A. Summary of Proceedings in Lower Courts 
The trial court concluded that it was "undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags because she neyer abandoned them. 
However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate expectation of privacy becomes 
irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal" (R. 71). In reaching its 
decision to deny Harding's motion to suppress, the trial court relied upon the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 
L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The trial court concluded: 
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her 
bags or attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given 
those circumstances, Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they 
were; he just proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme 
court explained in Jimeno, it is objectively reasonable for an officer to search a 
1
 The State stipulated before the trial court that Harding had standing to challenge the 
search of her bags because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bags and did 
not abandon them. R. 70. See also, Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^f 11-12. See also 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d408 (1999) 
(Passengers in automobiles possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in their own 
belongings). 
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container 4which might bear drugs.' Bags in a vehicle could certainly contain 
drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively 
reasonable. Thus Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent 
given to search the vehicle 
(R. 70). However, in denying Harding's suppression motion, the trial court also found 
that "Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just 
proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle" (R. 70). 
The majority of the court of appeals agreed and affirmed the denial of Harding's 
motion to suppress. State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 223 P.3d 1148. The court of 
appeals concluded that it was reasonable for police to believe that the driver had authority 
to consent to the search of the bags because: there was nothing on or about the bags to 
indicate they belonged to anyone else, neither the driver nor the passengers informed the 
officer of where they had been or where they were going nor did they state the bags 
belonged to anyone other than the driver, and no one objected to the search. Id. at \ 19. 
"Under these circumstances," the majority concluded, "it was objectively reasonable for 
Officer Westerman to believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief that the bags 
belonged to one of the passengers would necessarily be based on speculation. On the 
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that a car owner would toss or place bags 
or other items in a small storage area of a car, located behind the passenger seat. We 
therefore conclude that... search of [Harding's] bags was lawful." Id. 
Judge Thorne, on the other hand, dissented. One, because "It is undisputed in this 
case that the driver did not have actual authority to consent to the search of [Harding's] 
bags. Thus, in order for the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate that the facts 
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known to Officer Westerman would nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable 
caution to conclude that the driver had such authority." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at f^ 25 
(citing State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^ 14, 131 P.3d 246, affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156 
P.3d 795 and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 
148 (1990)). Two, because the trial court expressly found that the officer had no way of 
knowing who the bags belonged to, and "the only indicia of ownership or control of the 
bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple passengers and 
in an area accessible to those passengers." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^ 22, 25. Under 
these known facts, Thorne concluded, that "[a]t best, Officer Westerman was presented 
with a situation where ownership and control of the bag was ambiguous. Utah law 
requires further inquiry before a consent search can be deemed valid in such ambiguous 
situations." Id. at f 26 (citing Duron, 2005 UT App 409 at \ 17, and State v. Davis, 965 
P.2d 525, 533 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999)). Westerman 
made no further inquiry and therefore, he lacked a reasonable belief as to the driver's 
ownership of the bags, mandating a holding that the State "failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating that the driver had the apparent authority to consent to the search of 
Defendant's bags." Id. at \ 22. 
B. Analytical Framework regarding Apparent Authority from State and Federal 
Jurisprudence 
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. Katzv. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Consensual 
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searches have long been approved by U.S. courts as an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment because "it is no doubt reasonable for the police to 
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so. Florida v. Jirneno, 500 U.S. 
248,250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). See also, Schnecklothv. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); and State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). Consent need not be given only by the 
defendant. It may come from "a third party who possesses] common authority over or 
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). See also 
State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 11, 131 P.3d 246, affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d 
795. 
However, a warrantless search is justified even where common authority is 
lacking, provided the officer reasonably relied on a third party's demonstration of 
apparent authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 
L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). This is so, "[bjecause many situations which confront officers in the 
course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for 
some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on 
facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186, 
110 S.Ct. at 2800 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 
1311, 93 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1949)). Accordingly, apparent authority exists when "the facts 
available to the officer at the moment... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that the consenting party had authority over the premises" or items to be searched. Id, at 
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488. See also Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at \14 (If known facts would not cause person 
of reasonable caution to conclude that consenting party had Authority, then warrantless 
entry/search without further inquiry is unlawful unless actual authority exists.). 
Moreover, u[t]he State bears the burden of proving cdmmon authority, and it must 
do so by a preponderance of the evidence." Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (citing Matlock, 415 
U.S. at 177-78 n.14, 94 S.Ct. at 996 n.14). See also Rodriquez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 
S.Ct at 2797. The State also has the burden of proving the rjeasonableness of the 
officer's actions during an investigative detention. Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at j^ 24 
(Thome J., dissent) (quoting State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,123, 164 P.3d 397). 
Finally, under Utah law, the State cannot meet its burden of proving apparent or common 
authority '" if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without 
making further inquiry,'" Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at ^ 16-17 (While officers must 
have some room to make mistakes in executing their duties, the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. With 
factual ambiguity present, it was not reasonable to proceed with the warrantless search 
absent reasonable inquiry into Mother's mutual use of the trailer) (quoting Davis, 965 
P.2d at 533). 
This Court granted certiorari in this matter to decide whether the majority of the 
panel of the Utah court of appeals erred in its analysis and/or application of the Fourth 
Amendment standards governing the apparent authority of a person to consent to the 
search of another person's property. To Harding's knowledge, this Court has never 
squarely addressed the issue of apparent authority in this or any similar context (although 
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this Court did address the authority of a third person to consent to the search of a 
"common area" in Brown, 853 P.2d 851). On the other hand, the court of appeals has 
addressed it in Harding, Duran, Davis and Messer. 
In Davis, 965 P.2d 525, a case where certiorari review was denied by this Court 
(982 P.2d 88), the court of appeals examined whether the right to perform a 
consentsearch a probationer's home/property—including common areas—extended to 
another resident's property/vehicle. The court concluded that "It is clear... that the 
officers conducted their search of the Davis and Hyatt property without any particular 
concern for areas over which Hyatt may have possessed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The officers were faced with what can only be described as an 'ambiguous' 
situation concerning whether Davis had common authority over the [vehicle].... [T]he 
State failed to show that the officers knew facts which reasonably supported a belief that 
Davis had common authority over the [vehicle]. The officers did not have enough 
information to determine that the [vehicle] was within Davis' common authority and 
therefore subject to search.... We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in failing to 
suppress the evidence found in the [vehicle]." Id. at 534-35. 
In Duran, 2005 UT App 409, which was affirmed by this court on grounds other 
than apparent authority (2007 UT 23), the court of appeals concluded that the evidence 
should have been suppressed. There, the officers were faced with an ambiguous situation 
concerning a camp trailer. Police had received a report that the defendant was using 
drugs on the property and in the trailer. Although the trailer was owned by a third person 
(the defendant's mother) and was located on that person's property, it was rented to the 
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defendant. Despite the ambiguity, the officers made no inquiry as to the third person's 
mutual use of the trailer or her joint access to it. Instead, they proceeded directly with the 
warrantless search of the trailer based upon the consent of the third person. The court of 
appeals concluded that "the failure of the officers to make reasonable inquiry in the face 
of an ambiguous situation concerning the use of the trailer is fatal to a claim" that it was 
reasonable for them to believe that the third person had authority to consent to the search 
of the trailer. 2005 UT App 409 at ffif 2-3, 15-17, 23. 
In Messer, 2007 UT App 166, police suspected the defendant and his girlfriend, 
Karen Hardy, of producing methamphetamine. After the defendant and Hardy were 
arrested for parole violations, Hardy provided police with information that the 
methamphetamine lab was located on the property of a third party, Tim Hasch. Police 
visited Hasch and he gave the officers permission to search a vehicle located on his 
property. Police searched the vehicle's trunk and found several bags. Hasch informed 
police that the bags belonged to defendant and that defendant also had a key to the 
vehicle. Then, without objection from Hasch, police searched the contents of the bags 
and discovered materials for methamphetamine production. The case went to trial and 
Messer was convicted of unlawful possession of laboratory equipment, but subsequently 
appealed his conviction, claiming in part that his trial counsel was ineffective. 2007 UT 
App 166 at fflf 2-4. On appeal, the court of appeals considered whether "Hasch's consent 
to search the car was insufficient to allow the search of the Defendant's bags stored in the 
trunk's car." Id. at f 20. The court of appeals concluded the search was valid because by 
"leaving the bags in Hasch's car on Hasch's property, Defendant took the risk that Hasch 
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might not maintain Defendant's privacy interest in the bags." Id. at TJ 22. Essentially, 
defendant abandoned his expectation to privacy in his property by leaving it in Hasch's 
vehicle. 
The closest applicable United States Supreme Court case appears to be Jimeno, 
which was relied upon almost exclusively by the trial court. In Jimeno, police overheard 
the defendant arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. 
The officer followed his car and stopped him for a traffic violation (making a right turn at 
a red light without stopping). 500 U.S. at 249, 111 S.Ct. at 103. The officer told the 
defendant he had been stopped for committing a traffic violation. The officer went on to 
say that he had reason to believe that narcotics were being carried in the car, and asked 
permission to search the vehicle. The defendant indicated he had nothing to hide and 
consented to the search. Id. After the occupants of the vehicle exited, the officer went to 
the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag on the 
floorboard. He picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. Id. 
Before trial the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on grounds that his 
consent to search did not extend to the closed paper bag inside the car. Id. The United 
States Supreme Court certiorari and looked at "whether it is reasonable for an officer to 
consider a suspect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a 
paper bag lying on the floor of the car." Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. The 
Court stated that, "The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object." Id. 
(citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)). The 
Court went on to conclude: 
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In this case, the terms of the search's authorization were simple. [Defendant] 
granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit 
limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had informed [defendant] that he 
believed [defendant] was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for 
narcotics in the car. We think that it was objectively [reasonable for the police to 
conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to 
search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person 
may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a 
container. 'Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car.' 
[Ross, 456 U.S.] at 820, 102 S.Ct. at 2170. The authorization to search in this 
case, therefore, extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag 
lying on the car's floor. 
500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. 
However, there are some important distinctions in Jirneno that the trial court, and 
to a certain extent, the majority of the court of appeals, failed to recognize. First, the 
search in Jimeno was based on more than mere consent. There, the officers also had—at 
a minimum—reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, i.e. illegal possession/trafficking 
in narcotics. Two, the U.S. court did not address the issue ota third-party's authority to 
consent to the warrantless search of another's property. Instead the court examined 
"whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general consent to a search 
of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car." 500 
U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct at 1804. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5,118, 621 N.W.2d 891 
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("The question of whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies the 
warrantless search of a passenger's belongings within the vehicle has not been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court"). Finally, there is a conflict between jurisdictions as 
to whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies a warrantless search of a 
passenger's belongings. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, n.3, 621 N.W.2d 891; and 
State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. 2002) (summarizing cases on each side of 
the issue). 
C. Under these facts, the Driver Lacked Apparent Authority to Consent to the 
Search of Harding's Property, Particularly as it was Not Reasonable for 
Officer Westerman to Search those Bags without Making Further Inquiry 
The "question presented in this case involves the driver's authority to consent to 
the search of [Harding's] bags." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^ f 23 (J. Thorne, dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). The majority of the court of appeals concluded that it was 
reasonable for police to believe that the driver had authority to consent to the search of 
the bags because: there was nothing on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to 
anyone else, neither the driver nor the passengers informed the officer of where they had 
been or where they were going nor did they state the bags belonged to anyone other than 
the driver, and no one objected to the search. Id. at ^ 19. "Under these circumstances/' 
the majority concluded, "it was objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe 
the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief that the bags belonged to one of the 
passengers would necessarily be based on speculation. On the other hand, it is patently 
reasonable to believe that a car owner would toss or place bags or other items in a small 
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storage area of a car, located behind the passenger seat. We therefore conclude that... 
search of [Harding's] bags was lawful" Id. 
However, the "storage area" at issue here is that of an SUV, which is typically 
more open and easily accessible from the backseat. Moreovpr, the bags were located 
directly behind Harding. In addition, when the driver consented to the search of the 
vehicle it was done outside and away from the car while Handing and the other 
passengers were inside the vehicle. Westerman never informed the passengers he would 
be searching the vehicle and never inquired of anyone as to ownership of the bags, 
although they could have belonged to any of the four indivicfuals present. In addition, he 
never asked them about where they had been or where they Ivere going, nor did he inform 
them why he was searching or for what he was looking. He simply searched the vehicle 
and the bags with "no way of knowing whose bags they were." R. 70. 
The majority, in part, relied upon its earlier decision in Messer. However, in that 
case, the defendant was not present at the scene during the search of the car. The vehicle 
in Messer belonged to the third party consenter (although the defendant had a key to the 
car), was located on the third person's property, and only the third party was present 
during the search. Essentially, the defendant had abandoned his property by leaving them 
in another's vehicle thereby running the risk that the other might not maintain the 
defendant's privacy interest. That is not this case. Harding was present at the scene of 
the search, along with the driver and two other passengers. 
Another important consideration is that the search in this case was based solely on 
consent. Unlike, Messer, Duron, and Jimeno, Officer Westerman had no probable cause 
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or even reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the driver or the 
passengers, including Harding. 
In the court of appeals, Harding argued the appropriateness of applying the ruling 
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). Harding argued this case because it addresses an almost identical fact pattern as is 
present here. 
In Frank, a vehicle was stopped for having only one working headlight. 650 
N.W.2d at 215. There were two passengers in the vehicle, including the defendant. In 
response to a question as to the group's destination, the officer became suspicious of drug 
activity. He gave the driver a "fix-it" ticket, separated the individuals in the car, and 
questioned them further. Id. Out of appellant's hearing, the Officer asked the 
owner/driver for permission to search the vehicle for "multiple things, bodies, weapons, 
guns, drugs." Id. The owner/driver consented. After searching all but the area of the 
backseat where the other passenger remained seated, the officer opened the trunk of the 
vehicle and found two suitcases. The officer did not ask who owned the suitcases and did 
not ask permission from the passengers to search the suitcases, but searched them based 
on the consent of the owner/driver. Id. In one of the suitcases he found what appeared to 
be controlled substances and a handgun. The officer subsequently learned that the 
suitcase belonged to the defendant/appellant. Id. 
In Frank, the State argued that under Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 99 S.Ct. 
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the "consent search of the suitcase did not violate the 
warrant requirement because the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the 
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driver's consent extended to the suitcases." 650 N.W.2d at 217. The Minnesota court 
then summarized the Jimeno case, similar to what the trial court did here, and stated as 
follows: "[T]he Court also specifically indicated that although it may be reasonable to 
search a paper bag on the floor of a vehicle, it may not be reasonable to search a locked 
briefcase found in the trunk of a car. [Jimeno, 500 U.S.] at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. 
Each case depends on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the officer to hold in a 
particular situation. M a t 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04." Frank, 650N.W.2dat 217. 
The Frank court then examined cases from other jurisdictions on the in regards to 
the question of whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies the 
warrantless search of a passenger's belongings inside the vehicle, and held: "We 
conclude that the cases holding that a driver's consent to search a motor vehicle does not 
extend to property owned by passengers who are present and available to consent to the 
search of their property are more consistent with constitutional limits on warrantless 
searches that the cases that conclude otherwise." 650 N.W.2d at 218-19 (citing Brown v. 
State, 789 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2001) (holding that driver's consent to 
search vehicle was not valid third-party consent for search of items such as purses or 
fanny packs possessed by passengers when it is clear that the owner of the item is present 
and available to consent)). The court in Frank concluded further that, "when a vehicle 
search is based only on consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of 
items not owned by or within the control of the consenter when the circumstances do not 
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or controls the item to be searched. 
Because the officer lacked consent for the search of appellant's suitcase, the district court 
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clearly erred by denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 
suitcase;' 650 N.W.2d at 219. 
Like in Frank, the driver in this case was asked for consent to search the car 
outside of her hearing. The driver was outside the vehicle while Harding and the other 
two passengers remained inside the vehicle. In both cases the search was conducted 
based upon the consent of the driver. In Frank, however, the officer questioned each of 
the vehicle's occupants and became suspicious of drug activity. Here, Officer 
Westerman had no suspicion of any criminal activity outside of the initial traffic 
violation. Westerman also testified that the bags were located in a small space for storage 
directly behind where Harding was sitting, but that he did not ask whom the bags 
belonged to before he searched them (R. 112:8, 16). Moreover, Westerman's only 
comment to the passengers including Harding was that they should exit the vehicle and 
"wait with that other officer, while [he] to a look in the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). Westerman 
did not explain to the driver what he wished to search for when he obtained her consent, 
nor did he tell the passengers. In fact, he failed to even mention to the passengers that he 
was searching the vehicle based on the driver's consent. Even in denying Harding's 
motion to suppress, the trial court found that "Officer Westerman had no way of knowing 
whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle." R. 70. 
The majority of the court of appeals disagreed with Harding's application of Frank 
because "we believe that Frank's requirement is too sweeping." Harding, 2010 UT App 
8 a t ! 17. 
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Judge Thome, on the other hand, saw no need to rely on Frank because he "would 
suppress the results of the search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah law." Id. at f^ 
28. Nonetheless, Judge Thorne uagree[d] with the logic and analysis of Frank and 
note[d] that its common-sense holding is itself merely another way of stating Utah's law 
that a consent search based on apparent authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of 
ownership or control." Id. 
Judge Thorne dissented based upon a couple of factors: One, because "It is 
undisputed in this case that the driver did not have actual authority to consent to the 
search of [Harding's] bags. Thus, in order for the State to justify the search, it must 
demonstrate that the facts known to Officer Westerman would nevertheless have caused a 
person of reasonable caution to conclude that the driver had such authority." Harding, 
2010 UT App 8 at 125 (citing State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 14, 131 P.3d 246, 
affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d 795 and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 
S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). Two, because the trial court expressly found that 
the officer had no way of knowing who the bags belonged to, and "the only indicia of 
ownership or control of the bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along 
with multiple passengers and in an area accessible to those passengers." Harding, 2010 
UT App 8 at fflf 22, 25. Under these known facts, Thorne concluded, that "[a]t best, 
Officer Westerman was presented with a situation where ownership and control of the 
bag was ambiguous. Utah law requires further inquiry before a consent search can be 
deemed valid in such ambiguous situations." Id. at 126 (citing Duran, 2005 UT App 409 
at % 17, and State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 
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88 (Utah 1999)). Westerman made no further inquiry and therefore, he lacked a 
reasonable belief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, mandating a holding that the 
State "failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent 
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's bags." Id at J^ 22. 
Harding asserts that Judge Thorne is correct and urges this Court to conclude as he 
did. His conclusions are the right conclusions under Utah law. The analysis and 
requirements from his dissent and from the court of appeals panels in Davis and Duran 
concerning the need for further inquiry when ambiguity is present in cases involving 
common or apparent authority is workable, sensible, and strikes a good balance between 
an individuals right to privacy and law enforcements need to maintain order and prevent 
crime—particularly here where there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Harding asks that this Court reverse the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, reverse her conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and remand this matter 
back to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her pleas may be withdrawn and 
the evidence suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8TH day of November, 2010. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Petitioner 
^ 
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Background: Defendant was convicted pursuant to 
conditional guilty pleas in the Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, Claudia La>cock, J., of illegal 
possession or use of a controlled substance and pos-
session of a dangerous weapon by a restricted per-
son. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that: 
(1) encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer 
de-escalated from investigatory detention to con-
sensual encounter, and 
(2) search of defendant's bags was based on a reas-
onable belief that they belonged to driver of vehicle 
and that driver had authority to consent to their 
search. 
Affirmed. 
Thorne, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
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110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
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1 lOkl 134.35 k. Searches and seizures. 
Most Cited Cases 
An appellate court affords little discretion to the 
district court's determination in cases involving the 
legality of a search and seizure because there must 
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 
4. 
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48AK349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(!7) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the purpose 
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention 
quite brief. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases 
When a traffic stop occurs, the driver of the car is 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
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48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases 
A passenger of a car is seized when a traffic stop 
occurs and so may challenge the constitutionality of 
the stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or 
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases 
Seizure of driver or passenger of vehicle continues 
for the duration of a traffic stop. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
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Generally speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic viola-
tion observed by an officer is justified. U.S.C.A. 
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Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
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48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Once the purpose of the initial traffic stop is con-
cluded, the person must be allowed to depart. 
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.4. 
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48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
A traffic stop that begins as a seizure may de-
escalate to a mere consensual encounter. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Any investigatory traffic stop may properly be de-
termined to have de-escalated to a consensual en-
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counter when a reasonable person would believe, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or 
she is free to end the encounter and depart. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
An encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be 
deemed to have de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, for Fourth Amendment purposes, unless 
the driver's documents have been returned to her. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether encounter initiated by a 
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, a court, if the driver's documents have 
been returned, considers factors tending to show 
de-escalation, including informing a person she is 
free to leave, or that she does not have to answer 
additional questions. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
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48Ak349( 14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether encounter initiated by a 
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual en-
counter, factors that weigh against de-escalation in-
clude failure to issue a warning or citation before 
engaging in additional questioning and a coercive 
show of authority, such as the presence of more 
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical 
touching by the officer, or the officer's use of a 
commanding tbne of voice indicating that compli-
ance might be compelled. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 
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48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
&Ak349(18) k. Inquiry; license, 
registration, or Warrant checks. Most Cited Cases 
Encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer, who 
initiated traffic stop for equipment violation, de-
escalated from investigatory detention to consensu-
al encounter, before officer asked driver if he could 
look in her vehicle; driver's documents had been re-
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turned to her and she was cited for violations, there 
was distinct break in encounter when officer told 
driver she was free to leave, officers' vehicles' 
emergency lights were off, and there was no indica-
tion that officers' weapons were displayed, that of-
ficers touched driver or passengers, or that officer 
used commanding tone of voice, as would suggest 
coercion. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4. 
[14] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>186 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349k 186 k. Scope and duration of consent; 
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases 
Search of bags of defendant, who was passenger in 
vehicle stopped for traffic violations, was based on 
a reasonable belief that they belonged to driver and 
that driver had authority to consent to their search; 
officer, during search of vehicle, found two bags 
and various loose items in cargo space behind back 
seat of vehicle, there was nothing on or about bags 
to indicate they belonged to anyone other than 
driver, none of the vehicle's occupants stated that 
bags belonged to anyone other than driver, and no 
one objected to search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
[15] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>186 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349k 186 k. Scope and duration of consent; 
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases 
If a person consents to a general search of their 
property, within which is contained property owned 
by another person, the consent is valid so long as 
the consenting party has authority over the area or 
has a sufficient relationship to the premises or ef-
fects sought to be inspected. U.S.CA. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
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Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and GREEN-
FNT WOOD. 
FN1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela 
T. Greenwood heard and voted on this case 
as regular members of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. They both retired from the court 
on January 1, 2010, before this decision is-
sued. Hence, they are designated herein as 
Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 




J 1 Defendant Tina Harding appeals her convictions 
for illegal possession or use of a controlled sub-
stance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. These charges stem from the 
search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a pas-
senger. Specifically, she appeals the trial court's 
denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained 
during the search, arguing that the search of her 
bags, which were inside the rear storage compart-
ment of the vehicle, was *1150 a violation of her 
Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
5 2 Defendant was a passenger in her friend's 
vehicle when Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a 
traffic stop for an equipment violation because the 
vehicle's plate lamp was inoperable. Officer West-
erman ran a routine check on the driver and learned 
that she did not have a valid driver license. He then 
requested the names and birth dates of each of the 
three passengers and discovered that none of them 
had a valid driver license. Officer Westerman 
asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a 
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and driving 
without a license. He then told her she was free to 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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leave, but advised her to contact someone to come 
drive the vehicle because none of the passengers 
had a valid driver license. The driver began to walk 
toward her vehicle but returned to ask Officer 
Westerman a question. At that point, Officer West-
erman asked her if he could look in the vehicle and 
she consented. Officer Westerman asked the pas-
sengers to exit the vehicle and told them they could 
wait with the backup officer "if they wanted." This 
second officer arrived before Officer Westerman 
completed his investigation and prior to the driver 
consenting to a search. The emergency lights on 
both of the officers' vehicles were off before the 
driver exited her vehicle. 
FN2. Defendant initially gave a false name 
to Officer Westerman. 
5 3 During Officer Westerman's search of the 
FN3 
vehicle he found a brown bag and a blue bag 
in the cargo space behind the back seat of the 
vehicle. Before searching the bags, Officer Wester-
man did not ask to whom they belonged, and none 
of the passengers claimed ownership of them. There 
were no visible indications on the bags that they be-
longed to anyone other than the driver. The bags 
contained drugs and drug paraphernalia and other 
items indicating the bags belonged to Defendant. 
Officer Westerman then searched Defendant and 
found a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade. 
Officer Westerman arrested Defendant and gave her 
Miranda warnings. 
FN3. Although Defendant describes the 
bags as backpacks in her briefs, Officer 
Westerman testified that they were bags. 
He was the only witness who testified. 
J 4 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but 
the trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered 
conditional guilty pleas, see State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (discussing and 
expressly authorizing guilty pleas conditioned upon 
the ability to appeal the denial of a motion to sup-
press evidence), and now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ 11 5 5 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying her motion to suppress evidence because 
the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal 
search and seizure. We afford little discretion to the 
district court's determination in cases involving the 
legality of a search and seizure "because there must 
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials." State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, 5 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)!. 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Initial Detention De-escalated to a Consensu-
al Encounter 
[2|[3](4|[5|[6| J 6 Unreasonable searches are pro-
hibited by the I Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
This protection extends to automobile stops, al-
though reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the 
"purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting de-
tention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 
When a traffic stop occurs, "the driver of the car is 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment .... [and] a passenger is seized as well and so 
may challenge the constitutionality of the stop." 
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 
S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). That seizure 
continues "[f]or the duration of a traffic stop." Ari-
zona v. Johnson, — U.S. —-, —-, 129 S.Ct. 781, 
782, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Generally*! 151 
speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation ob-
served by an officer is justified. See Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, 5 30, 63 P.3d 650. Recognizing this prin-
ciple, the parties in this case stipulated that the ini-
tial traffic stop was a legally valid investigatory de-
tention. 
17] [8] [9] 5 7 "Once the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded ... the person must be allowed to depart." 
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Id. J 31. Further, "[a] traffic stop that begins as a 
seizure may de-escalate to a mere consensual en-
counter." Id. 5 33. Thus, we consider whether the 
vehicle occupants' encounter with Officer Wester-
man had de-escalated from an investigatory deten-
tion to a consensual encounter before Officer West-
erman asked the driver if he could look in her 
vehicle. Any investigatory traffic stop may properly 
be determined to have "de-escalate[d] to a consen-
sual encounter when a reasonable person would be-
lieve, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that he or she is free to end the encounter and de-
part." Id. 5 39. 
[10|1111[12| J 8 In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
63 P.3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court addressed de-
escalations to consensual encounters. By definition, 
" 'an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not 
be deemed consensual unless the driver's docu-
ments have been returned to [her].' " Id. 5 40 
(quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 
979 (10th Cir.1996)). If the driver's documents 
have been returned, we consider "factors tending to 
show de-escalation," including "informing a person 
[s]he is free to leave, or that [s]he does not have to 
answer additional questions." Id. 5 41. By contrast, 
factors that weigh against de-escalation include 
"failure to issue a warning or citation before enga-
ging in additional questioning" and "a coercive 
show of authority, such as the presence of more 
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical 
touching by the officer, or [the officer's] use of a 
commanding tone of voice indicating that compli-
ance might be compelled." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
J 9 In Hansen, the supreme court reversed this 
court's decision that a traffic stop had de-escalated 
to a consensual encounter, determining that there 
was no noticeable break between the initial traffic 
stop and the further questioning unrelated to the 
purpose for the traffic stop. See id. 5 68. In addi-
tion, the officer did not address the traffic viola-
tions before questioning the defendant about pos-
sible contraband and did not tell the defendant he 
was free to leave. See id. 5 45. Because the supreme 
court "questioned] whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave before being issued a warn-
ing or citation, or at least being told he or she could 
leave," id., it concluded that the "detention had not 
de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time 
of the additional questioning; and thus, [the defend-
ant] was illegally seized," id. 5 46. 
[13) Jf 10 In this case, however, the driver's docu-
ments had been returned to her and she was cited 
for the equipment violation and lack of a driver li-
cense. Further, there was a distinct break in the en-
counter when Officer Westerman told the driver she 
was free to leave. At that point, the purpose of the 
traffic stop had clearly been concluded. However, 
the driver then approached Officer Westerman to 
ask a question. While it is true that there was a 
backup officer present, the facts do not suggest co-
ercion. For example, the officers' vehicles' emer-
gency lights were off, and there is no indication that 
the officers' weapons were displayed, that the of-
ficers touched the driver or the passengers, or that 
the officer used a commanding tone of voice. See 
id. J 41 (listing these criteria as examples of beha-
vior that would indicate coercion). 
5 11 We conclude that, under these circumstances, 
the driver would have reasonably felt free to leave 
and, therefore, the encounter had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter. See id. 33 33-34. Thereafter, 
the driver consented to a search of the vehicle. Al-
though Defendant lacked standing to object to the 
search because she did not own or exercise author-
ity over the vehicle, the State stipulated that she 
had standing to challenge the search of her bags be-
cause she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the bags and did not abandon them. Thus, we turn 
to the legality of the search of Defendant's *1152 
u FN? bags. 
FN4. Defendant's primary argument per-
taining to the legality of the search is that 
there was no de-escalation from the seizure 
resulting from the traffic stop. We have de-
termined that de-escalation did occur prior 
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to the driver consenting to the search and 
that Defendant lacks standing to object to 
the consent to search the vehicle. However, 
Defendant also argued to the trial court, 
and briefly on appeal, that the seizure of 
the passengers continued during the 
vehicle search because the passengers 
could not have reasonably believed they 
were free to leave. The trial court rejected 
this argument as irrelevant because De-
fendant could not object to the vehicle 
search because she did not own the 
vehicle. Defendant cites no authority ad-
dressing whether, when the traffic stop is 
over from the driver's standpoint, it is also 
over for any passengers. Furthermore, De-
fendant does not address how, if at all, de-
escalation as to the driver from a valid 
traffic stop to a consensual encounter af-
fects her status as a passenger. In this re-
spect, Defendant's brief is inadequate. See 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 
(Utah 1998) (noting that generally we will 
not address an inadequately briefed argu-
ment). 
Our analysis assumes that, as is the case 
here, nothing happened to raise any sus-
picions about the vehicle's passengers. 
The only facts of record that would in-
dicate a continued detention of the pas-
sengers is Officer Westerman's request 
that they exit the vehicle and suggestion 
that they stand by the second officer 
while Officer Westerman conducted the 
search. Nothing occurred that would 
cause Officer Westerman to suspect De-
fendant or the other passengers of illegal 
activity or to believe that they had a 
basis to object to a search of the vehicle 
or its contents. Given these circum-
stances and the lack of adequate briefing 
by Defendant, we decline to further ad-
dress this possible issue. See id. 
II. The Search of Defendant's Bags Was Legal 
[ 14| 5 12 Our analysis of the legality of the search 
of Defendant's bags begins with the question of 
whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to 
conclude that the driver's consent extended to De-
fendant's personal belongings. As noted above, the 
State concedes that Defendant has standing to chal-
lenge whether the officer had a reasonable belief 
that the drivers consent to search the vehicle exten-
ded to Defendant's bags. 
[15| J 13 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 
S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under 
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reason-
ableness-what would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the of-
ficer and the suspect?" Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801 
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89, 
110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In Ji-
meno, the car driver consented to a search and the 
officer searched a folded, brown paper bag located 
on the floor of the car, discovering cocaine in the 
bag. See id. The Court examined whether the con-
sent extended to the paper bag and concluded "that 
it was objectively reasonable for the police to con-
clude that the general consent to search [the] car in-
cluded consent to search containers within that car 
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may 
be expected to know that narcotics are generally 
carried in sonie form of a container." Id. Further-
more, if a person consents to a general search of 
their property, within which is contained property 
owned by another person, the consent is valid so 
long as the consenting party has authority over the 
area or has a "sufficient relationship to the premises 
or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Messer, 
2007 UT App 166,3 21, 164 P.3d 421. 
5 14 The critical inquiry then is whether the police 
officer reasonably believed that the consenting 
party has sufficient authority to consent to the 
search. In State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 164 
P.3d 421, the police searched a car located on a 
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third party's property with the property owner's 
consent and discovered contraband in bags in the 
car's trunk belonging to the defendant. See id. 3 4. 
This court noted that common authority over prop-
erty was not necessarily dependent on ownership, 
but could also be established by possession. See id. 
5 22. The search and seizure were upheld 
"[b]ecause the officers could have, at the very least, 
reasonably believed that [the property owner] had 
authority to consent to a search of the car trunk and 
its contents." Id. 5 23. 
3 15 The State cites cases holding that a driver's 
consent to a vehicle search extends to the property 
of a third person in the vehicle when the property 
does not clearly belong to a person other than the 
driver. *1153 See United States v. Hammons, 152 
F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that the de-
fendant's garment bag was properly searched where 
the defendant's wife consented to the vehicle search 
and the officers did not see identifying tags on the 
bag, reasonably believing that the bag belonged to 
the defendant's wife); State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 
191, 784 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (2001) (holding of-
ficers reasonably believed driver had authority to 
consent to search of bag belonging to defendant); 
State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 627 A.2d 1066, 
1070 (1993) (stating officers had reasonable belief 
driver had authority to consent to search of luggage 
in vehicle trunk where there were no indications 
luggage belonged to passengers). The State further 
contends that because the ultimate test of a search's 
legality is objective reasonableness, police officers 
are not required to seek permission to open each 
closed container during a consensual vehicle 
search, because consent to search a vehicle "is 
equivalent to general consent to search the vehicle 
and its contents, including containers such as lug-
gage," United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484 
(5th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Rich, 992 
F.2d502,508(5thCir.l993)). 
J 16 Defendant disagrees with the State's applica-
tion of this case law and argues that the driver's 
consent in this case did not extend to Defendant's 
bags located in the rear of the car. In support of that 
argument Defendant urges us to adopt the rule ap-
plied in State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213 
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). There, a vehicle was stopped 
for having only one working headlight. See id. at 
215. After citing the driver for the equipment viola-
tion, the officer became suspicious of drug activity, 
separated the individuals in the car, and asked the 
driver for and received permission to search the 
vehicle. See id. The officer opened the trunk of the 
vehicle and found two suitcases. See id. The officer 
did not ask who owned the suitcases and did not 
ask permission from the passengers to search the 
suitcases. See id. The officer found drugs and later 
learned that the suitcase belonged to the defendant, 
a passenger in the vehicle. See id. The Minnesota 
court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and 
"conclude[d] that the cases holding that a driver's 
consent to search a motor vehicle does not extend 
to property owned by passengers who are present 
and available to consent to the search of their prop-
erty are more consistent with constitutional limits 
on warrantless searches than the cases that conclude 
otherwise." Id. at 218-219. The Minnesota court 
held that, "when a vehicle search is based only on 
consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the 
ownership of items not owned by or within the con-
trol of the consenter when the circumstances do not 
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or 
controls the items to be searched." Id. at 219. 
J 17 Here, Defendant argues that a reasonable per-
son in Officer Westerman's position would reason-
ably believe that the bags belonged to one of the 
three passengers rather than to the driver. The pres-
ence of the three passengers and the location of the 
bags in the small storage space behind the rear pas-
senger seat would lead to that reasonable belief. 
Under these circumstances, Defendant asserts, Of-
ficer Westerman should have inquired about the 
bags' ownership and sought consent to search from 
anyone who asserted ownership. Defendant con-
tends that without having done so, Officer Wester-
man's search of the bags was illegal. We do not 
agree, and we believe that Frank's requirement is 
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too sweeping. 
5 18 As acknowledged in Frank, in determining 
what justifies a legal search, "[e]ach case depends 
on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the 
officer to hold in a particular situation." Id. at 217 
(citing Florida v. Juneno, 500 U.S. 248, 251. I l l 
S.Ct. 1801, 114 LEd2d 297 (1991)). If items in a 
vehicle clearly do not belong to a consenting driver 
and there are passengers who may likely own the 
items, the driver's consent to search would not reas-
onably extend to those items. Examples might in-
clude an item with a label or tag indicating owner-
ship, or a purse, when there is a male driver and a 
female passenger. See United States v. Welch, 4 
F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that under the 
circumstances it was not reasonable for officers to 
believe male driver had authority to consent to 
search of his passenger/girlfriend's purse). Other 
situations where the vehicle's contents are more 
*1154 anonymous would likely lead to an object-
ively reasonable belief that the consenting driver 
owned and/or exercised control over the vehicle 
and items contained therein. 
5 19 The particulars of the situation in this case 
lead us to conclude that the search of Defendant's 
bags was based on a reasonable belief that they be-
longed to the driver and that the driver had author-
ity to consent to their search. These particulars in-
clude the following, taken from the brief testimony 
of Officer Westerman, the only witness called to 
testify: (1) there was a small storage area in the rear 
of the car behind the backseat; (2) items in this 
storage area included a brown bag and a dark blue 
bag, and various loose items; (3) there was nothing 
on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to 
anyone other than the driver; (4) the vehicle's occu-
pants consisted of the driver and three passengers; 
(5) neither the driver nor any of the passengers in-
formed Officer Westerman about where they had 
been or where they were going; (6) none of the 
vehicle's occupants stated that the bags belonged to 
anyone other than the driver; and (7) no one objec-
ted to the search. Under these circumstances it was 
objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to 
believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief 
that the bags belonged to one of the passengers 
would necessarily be based on speculation. On the 
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that 
a car owner would toss or place bags or other items 
in a small storage area of a car, located behind the 
passenger sea);. We therefore conclude that under 
these circumstances, search of Defendant's bags 
was lawful. 
5 20 Affirmedl 
5 21 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Senior 
Judge. 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
5 22 I respectfully dissent from the majority opin-
ion, as I cannot agree with its conclusion that the 
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's 
consent was permissible. Here, the trial court ex-
pressly found that, under the circumstances, Officer 
Westerman "had no way of knowing whose bags 
they were." Accordingly, I disagree that Officer 
Westerman can be said to have had a reasonable be-
lief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, and I 
would hold th^t the State failed to meet its burden 
of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent 
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's 
bags. 
S 23 Both the trial court and, to a lesser extent, the 
majority opinion treat this as a case about the scope 
of the driver's cjonsent. It is not. There is no dispute 
that, had the bags belonged to the driver, permis-
sion to search the bags would have been included 
within the scope of her consent to search the car. 
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("We think that it 
was objectively reasonable for the police to con-
clude that the general consent to search respond-
ents' car included consent to search containers with-
in that car which might bear drugs."). Rather, the 
question presented in this case involves the driver's 
authority to consent to the search of the bags. 
J 24 " 'If a third party rather than the defendant 
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consents to a search, the third party must be one 
who possesses "common authority" over the area or 
has some other "sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected " ' " 
State v Messer 2007 UT App 166, 5 21 164 P 3d 
421 (quoting State \ B/own 853 P 2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992)) "Moreover, a search is valid even in 
instances where the third party does not possess 
common authority, as long as the police 
'reasonably beheve[ ]' " that the third party pos-
sesses such authority Id (alteration in original) 
(quoting Illinois v Rodriguez 497 US 177, 189, 
110 S Ct 2793, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990)) However, 
the State bears the burden of establishing that one 
who consents to a search has the authority to do so 
See Brown, 853 P 2d at 855 ("The State bears the 
burden of proving common authority, and it must 
do so by a preponderance of the evidence."), see 
also State v Worwood, 2007 UT 47,3 23, 164 P 3d 
397 ("When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden 
of proving the reasonableness of the officer's ac-
tions during an investigative detention ") 
S 25 It is undisputed in this case that the driver did 
not have actual authority to consent* 1155 to the 
FN5 
search of Defendant's bags. Thus, in order for 
the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate 
that the facts known to Officer Westerman would 
nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable 
caution to conclude that the driver had such author-
ity. Cf. State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409,5 14, 131 
P.3d 246 ("If the facts known to the officers would 
not cause a person of reasonable caution to con-
clude that the consenting party had authority over 
the premises, 'then warrantless entry without fur-
ther inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually 
exists' " (quoting Rodriguez, 497 US. at 188-89, 
110 S.Ct. 2793)). It appears that the only indicia of 
ownership or control of the bags was their mere 
presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple 
passengers and in an area accessible to those pas-
sengers. As the trial court aptly found, this informa-
tion alone gave Officer Westerman "no way of 
knowing whose bags they were." 
FN5 The trial court found that Defendant 
had not abandoned her bags and retained a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in them 
Further, this is not a case where Defendant 
left her bags in the care of a third person 
and thereby took the risk that the third per 
son might not respect her privacy See, 
e g , State v Messer 2007 UT App 166, 5 
22, 164 P 3d 421 ("[I]n leaving the bags in 
Hasch's car on Hasch's property, 
[defendant took the risk that Hasch might 
not maintain [defendant's privacy interest 
in the bags "), see also United States v 
Austin, 66 F 3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir 1995) 
("By leaving his bag in the possession and 
control of [a third party], defendant as-
sumed the risk that [the third party] would 
allow the authorities access to the bag ") 
5 26 At best, Officer Westerman was presented 
with a situation where ownership and control of the 
bags was ambiguous. Utah law requires further in-
quiry before a consent search can be deemed valid 
in such ambiguous situations. See id J 17 ("The of-
ficers were faced with an ambiguous situation con-
cerning the trailer. Although it was owned by 
Mother, it was rented to Horvath. Despite that am-
biguity, the officers made no further inquiry and 
proceeded with the warrantless [consent] search. 
The search was not lawful ...." (footnote omitted)); 
State v Davis, 965 P 2d 525, 533 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (stating that the State's burden to 
prove common authority cannot be met" 'if agents, 
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless 
proceed without making further inquiry' " (quoting 
United States v Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 
(D.C.Cir.1991))). 
J 27 Had Officer Westerman made further inquiry, 
he could likely have easily ascertained that the bags 
belonged to Defendant and sought her consent to 
search them. If further inquiry had resulted in the 
passengers, including Defendant, denying owner-
ship of the bags, then Officer Westerman would 
have had some reason to believe that the bags be-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
223 P.3d 1148,648 Utah Adv. Rep. 4,2010 UT App 8 
(Cite as: 223 P3d 1148) 
longed to the driver. Or, had everyone denied own- App 8 
ership of the bags, then perhaps an abandonment 
analysis would have been appropriate. See gener- hNu ( 
ally State v Rvnhart, 2005 UT 84. 9 21, 125 P.3d 
938 (discussing abandonment); see also United 
States v Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th 
Cir.1981) (finding abandonment where the defend-
ant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the 
seat of a vehicle). Here, however, Officer Wester-
man made no inquiry whatsoever and, thus, his 
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's 
consent cannot be deemed objectively reasonable 
under Utah case law governing consent searches. 
J 28 Because I would suppress the results of the 
search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah case 
law, I see no need to rely on Defendant's primary 
source of authority, State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213 
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). However, I agree with the lo-
gic and analysis of Frank and note that its common-
sense holding is itself merely another way of stating 
Utah's law that a consent search based on apparent 
authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of 
ownership or control. See id. at 219 ("[W]hen a 
vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer 
has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of 
items not owned by or within the control of the 
consenter when the circumstances do not clearly in-
dicate that the consenter is the owner or controls 
the item to be searched."). 
J 29 When Officer Westerman searched Defend-
ant's bags pursuant to the driver's consent, he had 
"no way of knowing whose bags they were." Faced 
with this ambiguity as to whose bags they were, Of-
ficer Westerman's*1156 search, without further in-
quiry, is objectively unreasonable and, therefore, 
unlawful. See Duran, 2005 UT App 409, J 17, 131 
P.3d 246; Davis, 965 P.2d at 533. For these reas-
ons, I would suppress the results of the search and 
reverse Defendant's resulting convictions, and I re-
spectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
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